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JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is conferred on the Utah Supreme Court 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j) (Supp. 1989). 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
In the lower court, Plaintiffs/Respondents, Don W. 
Ingram and Dick L. Ingram as Trustees and as Successor Trustees 
I 
of the J. Clarence Ingram and Kate W. Ingrairi Trust (hereinafter 
"Ingrains" or "Respondents"), brought suit against 
Defendants/Appellants, O.B. Sheep Company, Snell Olsen, Scott 
H. Olsen and Kirk Olsen (hereinafter "Olsens" or "Appellants"), 
to foreclose on real property (the "Real Property"), which had 
previously been sold to Olsens under a Trust Deed Note and 
Trust Deed, after Olsens defaulted on their obligations under 
the Trust Deed Note. (R. 1-17). On March 11, 1988, the lower 
court entered a money judgment in favor of the Ingrams and 
ordered that the Real Property be sold at public sale to 
satisfy the money judgment. (R. 646-651). The Real Property 
was sold at Sheriff's sale in August of 1988 and a Deficiency 
Judgment was entered on January 27, 1989. (R. 771-774). An 
Amended Deficiency Judgment was entered on February 10, 1989. 
(R. 778-782). 
Olsens are appealing the entry of the Amended 
Deficiency Judgment as it relates to the sale of the Utah 
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County property. Olsens timely filed a Notice of Appeal on 
March 2, 1989. (R. 791). 
ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Whether the lower court correctly ruled that the sale 
of the Utah County property was conducted properly and in a 
lawful manner and that Appellants waived any right they had to 
have the Utah County property sold as separate parcels. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
A copy of Rule 69, Utah R. Civ. P., is reproduced in 
the Addendum at Tab -1.•' 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Respondents accept Appellants' Statement of the Case 
as to the Nature of the Case and as to the Course of 
Proceedings Below. (Pages 2-3 of Appellants' Brief, paragraphs 
A. and B.). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On or about May 1, 1982, Olsens purchased from the 
Ingrams two parcels of property, one located in Wasatch County 
and one located in Utah County. The Olsens executed a Trust 
Deed Note for the balance of the purchase price and secured the 
payment of the Trust Deed Note with a Trust Deed. (R. 1-17). 
Olsens defaulted on the payments due to the Ingrams under the 
Trust Deed Note and the Ingrams subsequently filed this action 
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to foreclose the Trust Deed and Note as a mortgage. (R. 1-17). 
On March 11, 1988, the lower court entered a money judgment in 
favor of the Ingrams and ordered that the real property located 
in both Utah and Wasatch County be sold at public sale by the 
Sheriffs of the respective counties in order to satisfy the 
money judgment owed to the Ingrams. (R. 646-651). 
The Utah County property was sold on August 3, 1988 by 
Utah County Deputy Sheriff Arthur L. Adcock (hereinafter 
"Deputy Sheriff Adcock"). (R. 682-686). Defendant/Appellant 
Snell Olsen (hereinafter "Snell Olsen"), who is personally 
known to Deputy Sheriff Adcock, was present at the Sheriff's 
sale of the Utah County property. (R. 757-760). The standard 
operating procedure for the Utah County Sheriff's office with 
regard to Sheriff's sales involving real property which 
consists of multiple descriptions is to ask the parties in 
attendance at the sale if any of the parties desire to have 
each parcel sold separately. Unless a party in attendance at 
the sale specifically requests that the property be sold in 
separate parcels, the standard procedure is to sell the real 
property involved as a single piece. (R. 758 at paragraph 5). 
In conducting the Sheriff's sale of the Utah County property, 
Deputy Sheriff Adcock followed the Utah County Sheriff's office 
standard operating procedure in selling the Utah County 
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property. (R. 758 at paragraph 6). None of the parties in 
attendance at the Utah County Sheriff's sale held on August 3, 
1988/ including Snell Olsen, requested that the property 
involved be sold as separate parcels, nor did any party present 
at the sale object to the fact that the real property involved 
was sold as a single unit. (R. 758-759 at paragraph 7). 
Snell Olsen, in contesting Ingrams' Motion for 
Deficiency Judgment and the sale of the Utah County property, 
filed an affidavit wherein Snell Olsen claims that he did not 
hear the statements made by Deputy Sheriff Adcock, and further 
claims that he did not understand that he had a right to have 
the property sold in separate parcels nor that he had waived 
that right. (R. 747 at paragraphs 4-5.) Snell Olsen also 
stated in his Affidavit that there was at least one potential 
purchaser who had attended the sale and who had expressed to 
Snell Olsen an interest in a particular portion of the Utah 
County property. (R. 747 at paragraph 8). The Ingrams 
purchased the Utah County property at the Sheriff's sale being 
the only bidders on the property. (R. 682-684). 
The Wasatch County property was sold the next day on 
August 4, 1988, by Edwin Thacker, Sheriff of Wasatch County. 
At that sale, the Ingrams again purchased the property and were 
the only bidders at the sale. (R. 696, 705-707). 
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A deficiency on the judgment remained after the sale 
of the Utah and Wasatch County properties. The Ingrams filed 
a Motion for Entry of a Deficiency Judgment (R. 697-701), and 
Appellants filed a Memorandum in Opposition to the Motion of 
Entry of Deficiency Judgment on the general grounds that the 
requirements of Rule 69, Utah R. Civ. P., had not been 
satisfied. (R. 708-710). Appellants also requested that the 
court schedule oral arguments on Ingrams' Motion of Entry of 
Deficiency Judgment. (R. 711-712). Ingrams filed their 
response to Appellants' Memorandum in Opposition timely. (R. 
715-732). Two days before the date set for oral arguments on 
the Ingrams' Motion for Deficiency Judgment, Appellants filed 
a Supplemental Memorandum in Opposition to the Motion for Entry 
of Deficiency Judgment which raised for the first time the 
issue of the Utah County property not being sold as separate 
parcels. (R. 741-743). At the hearing on Ingrams' Motion for 
Entry of Deficiency Judgment, the court, after hearing the 
arguments of counsel, gave each side additional time to file 
supplemental memoranda on the issue of whether the Utah County 
property could be sold as a single parcel or had to be sold as 
separate parcels. (R. 744-745). The record does not indicate 
that any of the parties requested that an evidentiary hearing 
be held on the matter, even though the court inquired of 
5 
counsel for the parties if either of them desired an 
evidentiary hearing. 
Appellants filed their Motion to Vacate the Sale of 
the Utah County property on January 17, 1989, some five months 
after the holding of the sale and some four and a half months 
after the Ingrams filed their Motion for Entry of Deficiency 
Judgment. (R. 765-766). 
The lower court, after considering the arguments of 
counsel, and the numerous memoranda and affidavits filed by the 
parties, made the following findings: 
1. That the sale of the subject property was 
called by Deputy Sheriff Arthur L. Adcock on 
the third day of August 1988, and that he then 
conducted the sale of the real estate described 
in the order of sale. 
2. That Snell Olsen was personally known to 
said Deputy Sheriff and was present at the 
Sheriff's sale held on the aforesaid date. 
3. That the sale was conducted in the standard 
procedure for the Utah County Sheriff's office 
with regard to sales involving multiple parcels 
of real property and that the parties in 
attendance at the sale were asked if any of 
the parties desired to have the property sold 
in separate parcels, and that no such request 
was made by anyone, including Snell Olsen, and 
that therefore the property was sold as one 
unit. (R. 769-770). 
Pursuant to its findings, the lower court concluded 
that at the Sheriff's sale on August 3, 1988, Appellants failed 
to make a request that the Utah County property be sold as 
separate parcels and, therefore, Appellants waived any such 
right they would have had at that time to have the property 
sold as separate parcels, and that the sale as conducted by 
Deputy Sheriff Adcock was done in a lawful and proper manner. 
Accordingly, the lower court correctly ordered that Olsen's 
Motion for Entry of Deficiency Judgment be granted and that 
the Appellants' objections thereto be disallowed. (R. 769-
770). 
Appellants' appeal was timely filed with this court on 
March 2, 1989. (R. 791). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
On appeal, the findings of the lower court can only be 
reversed if the evidence clearly preponderates against the 
lower court's findings. The burden to show a clear 
preponderance against the lower court's findings is on 
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Appellants and this Court must view the evidence in a light 
most favorable to the court below. Appellants have failed to 
meet this burden and the record does not support such a burden. 
By acquiescing to the manner in which the sale of the property 
was performed, Appellants waived any right they might have had 
to enforce a sale of the property in individual parcels. At 
the very least, Appellants are estopped from contesting the 
validity of the sale. Where an irregularity is alleged in a 
judicial sale, the sale will not be set aside in the absence 
of a showing of prejudice. Appellants have not been prejudiced 
on the sale of the property as one unified parcel. Real 
property does not need to be sold in separate pieces under Rule 
69, Utah R. Civ. P., unless the property consists of several 
known lots or parcels. The property sold consisted of one 
unified piece of property and was properly sold as such. The 
ruling of the lower court should be affirmed. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING THAT THE APPELLANTS 
WAIVED ANY RIGHT TO HAVE THE PROPERTY 
SOLD AS SEPARATE PARCELS CAN BE REVERSED 
ONLY IF THE EVIDENCE CLEARLY PREPONDERATES 
AGAINST THE FINDINGS OF THE LOWER COURT 
To mount a successful attack on the lower court's 
findings of fact, Appellants must marshal all the evidence in 
£ 
support of the lower court's findings and then demonstrate that 
even viewing it in the light most favorable to the court below, 
the evidence is insufficient to support the findings. K.J. 
Scharf v. BMG Corporation, 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985). 
In K.J. Scharf, the lower court entered a deficiency judgment 
in favor of a lessor and the guarantor appealed. This Court 
held that the guarantor failed to sustain his burden of 
attacking the lower court's findings of fact. This principle 
is well stated in this Court's opinion in Jensen v. Brown, 639 
P.2d 150, 152 (Utah 1981)(citing Nokes v. Continental Mining 
& Milling Co., 6 Utah 2d at 178-179, 308 P.2d 954): 
[T]he finding of the trial court will not be 
disturbed if the evidence preponderates in 
favor of the finding; nor, if the evidence 
thereon is evenly balanced or it is doubtful 
where the preponderance lies; nor, even if its 
weight is slightly against the finding of the 
trial court, but it will be overturned and 
another finding made only if the evidence 
clearly preponderates against his findings. 
Appellants have not begun to carry this heavy burden 
on appeal. The facts before the lower court came from 
conflicting affidavits. Deputy Sheriff Adcock stated in his 
affidavit that he followed standard procedure and asked those 
assembled at the sale if anyone wanted to have the Utah County 
property sold in separate parcels and no one, including 
Appellant Snell Olsen, made such a request. Appellant Snell 
9 
Olsen stated in his affidavit that he does not remember whether 
or not Deputy Sheriff Adcock made such a statement and then 
states that, even if the Deputy Sheriff did make such a 
statement, he was too nervous to comprehend what was going on. 
Appellants don't even try to meet their burden. Appellants 
just state over and over again that the low€*r court made its 
decision "without an evidentiary hearing" as if it were the 
lower court's obligation to sue sponte hold an evidentiary 
hearing on the matter when not one of the parties made such a 
request. 
A careful review of the record does not support a 
decision by this Court that the evidence clearly preponderates 
against the lower court's findings. Therefore, the lower 
court's finding that the sale of the Utah County property was 
lawfully and properly held and that Appellants waived whatever 
rights they had to have the property sold in separate parcels 
should be affirmed. 
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POINT II 
APPELLANTS WAIVED THEIR RIGHT TO ENFORCE THE 
INDIVIDUAL SALE OF THE PARCELS COMPRISING THE PROPERTY 
Rule 69(c)(3), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides, 
in part, that " . . . when the sale is of real property, 
consisting of several known lots or parcels, they must be sold 
separately . . . . " The purpose behind such a rule is to 
ensure that a sale will realize the best price possible. 
However, statutory provisions for a division of property have 
been held to be merely directory, and the decision to sell the 
property en masse is a matter within the discretion of the 
officer conducting the sale, 33 C.J.S. Executions § 210a, and 
in some circumstances a sale en masse may be necessary, proper, 
or more expedient in order to protect the interests of all 
parties. 33 C.J.S. Executions § 210b. 
As the rule requiring a sale in parcels is intended 
for the benefit of the execution defendant, compliance with it 
may be waived by him, and such waiver may be implied from the 
defendant's acquiescence in the sale or from his delay in 
objecting thereto. American Falls Canal Securities Company v. 
American Savings and Loan Association. 109 Utah Adv. Rep. 21 
(Filed May 30, 1989); 33 C.J.S. Executions § 210c; see also 
Bawden and Associates v. Smith, 646 P.2d 711, 714 (Utah 1982). 
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This Court has adopted the general rule that an execution 
defendant can waive his right to have property sold in separate 
parcels. 
The customary procedure of the Utah County Sheriff's 
office is to begin each sale of real property by asking whether 
there are objections to the sale of the property en masse• If 
there are objections of any kind, the parcels are sold 
individually. (R. 758 at paragraph 5). At the beginning of 
the Utah County Sheriff's sale of the Utah County property, 
Deputy Sheriff Adcock followed the County's customary procedure 
and asked whether any of the parties in attendance at the sale 
desired to have the property sold in separate lots. 
Appellants, who were present at the sale, remained silent, as 
did everyone else in attendance. When Deputy Sheriff Adcock 
received no answer, he proceeded to sell the property en masse. 
(R. 758 at paragraphs 6 and 7.) 
Appellants had ample opportunity to protest the sale 
of the parcel en masse at the actual sale, yet they remained 
silent. The excuse given by Appellants for not speaking up is 
that Snell Olsen claims he was nervous, had never before 
attended a Sheriff's sale, and was unaware of the rule allowing 
the property to be sold as individual parcels. (R. 746 at 
paragraphs 3 and 5). Counsel for Appellants obviously knew 
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about the contents of Rule 69, but did not bother to inform his 
clients of their rights prior to the sale nor did Appellants' 
counsel attend the Sheriff's sale with his clients (who had 
never been to such a sale before). Appellants cannot now hide 
behind a wall of ignorance. By acquiescing to the manner in 
which the sale was performed, Appellants waived any right they 
might have had to enforce a sale of the individual parcels 
(assuming, arguendo, that the real property involved is 
actually deemed to be separate parcels). 
At the very least, Appellants should be estopped from 
contesting the validity of the Sheriff's sale. In Hunter v. 
Hunter, 669 P.2d 430 (Utah 1983), this Court set forth the 
distinction between the doctrines of estoppel and waiver. 
Waiver is the voluntary, intentional relinquishment of a known 
right. Estoppel is a doctrine which precludes parties from 
asserting their rights where their actions or conduct render 
it inequitable to allow them to assert those rights. Id., 669 
P.2d at 432. The Sheriff's sale of the Utah County property was 
conducted on August 3, 1988, with Snell Olsen in attendance. 
Appellants did not bother to object to the sale of the property 
en masse or even raise the issue until October 25, 1988, and 
then only in a Supplemental Memorandum filed in opposition to 
Ingrams' Motion for Entry of Deficiency Judgment. Appellants 
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waived their right to have the property sold in separate 
parcels and at the very least their delay in raising the 
objection in a timely manner estops Appellants from raising the 
objection. 
POINT III 
APPELLANTS HAVE FAILED TO SHOW THAT 
THE EN MASSE SALE OF THE PROPERTY 
RESULTED IN PREJUDICE TO THEM 
"The policy of the courts is to uphold judicial sales 
except when they are manifestly unfair . . . Especially is this 
true in a state such as Utah which has a substantial period of 
redemption." Mower v. Bohmke, 9 Utah 2d 52, 337 P.2d 429 
(1959). It is hoped that such a policy will encourage bidding 
at judicial sales and because it appears to be a waste of time 
to require a new sale where little evidences is presented to 
show that the bid price at the new sale will be any different 
from the bid at the old. Id. The general rule is that an 
execution sale need not be set aside merely because the 
property is sold en masse instead of in parcels. Whether the 
alleged irregularity is sufficient to justify vacating the sale 
has been regarded as a matter resting in the sound discretion 
of the court and will not be set aside in the absence of a 
showing of prejudice. Mower v. Bohmke, 9 Utah 2d 52, 337 P.2d 
429 (1959); Commercial Bank of Utah v. Madsen, 236 P.2d 343 
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(Utah 1951); 30 Am. Jur. 2d Execution § 732; 33 C.J.S. 
Executions § 210d. 
Appellants have made no showing that the sale of the 
real property by the Utah County Sheriff prejudiced them in 
any way. The only possibility for prejudice which Appellants 
present is the testimony of Snell Olsen that a third party at 
the sale mentioned to him that the third party might want to 
buy one certain section of the property, (R. 747 at paragraph 
8), but there is absolutely nothing in the record to indicate 
that the result of the sale would be any different if the sale 
were held again. The only benefit Appellants would receive 
from a resale of the Utah County property would be to further 
delay the conclusion of this action. The statutory redemption 
period has run and Respondents have received the Sheriff's deed 
conveying title to the Utah County property to them and setting 
aside the sale will result in great harm to the Olsens who are 
in the process of trying to resale the Utah County property. 
Appellants have not shown or even argued that they were 
prejudiced by the sale of the Utah County property in one 
piece, and assuming, arguendo, that Appellants could show 
prejudice, such prejudice is harmless and resulted from their 
own lack of action and should not be allowed to be used to set 
15. 
aside the sale of the Utah County property at this point in 
time. 
POINT IV 
THE UTAH COUNTY PROPERTY HAS NEVER BEEN TREATED 
OR KNOWN AS SEPARATE PARCELS 
The clear and unequivocable language of Rule 69(e)(3) 
states that real property does not need to be sold in separate 
pieces unless the real property consists "of several known lots 
or parcels," In Commercial Bank of Utah v. Marsden, 236 P.2d 
343 (Utah 1951), the plaintiff judicially foreclosed on a 
mortgage and then sought to vacate the sheriff's sale on 
several grounds, including the objection that, under Rule 
69(e)(3)/ the property should have been sold as two separate 
parcels. This Court specifically stated that, "[T]he fact that 
the land is described as 'Lots 1 and 2 of Block 28, Plat A, 
Manti City Survey' does not serve to make separate tracts of 
an otherwise unified parcel." Marsden, 236 P.2d at 345. This 
Court went on to state that the plaintiff had prepared and 
accepted a mortgage on the real property as one parcel, and 
that in its pleadings, judgment, notice of sale and throughout 
the entire proceeding, the property has been treated by 
plaintiff as one parcel of property. 
ii 
In the case at bar, all of the parties have 
consistently treated the Utah County property as a single 
parcel, e.Q,: the purchase price was not broken down by 
individual parcels, the property was secured by one Trust Deed 
and one Trust Deed Note, and through this entire proceeding, 
until this appeal, the parties have treated the Utah County 
property as a unified parcel. The court in Marsden also 
referred directly to 33 C.J.S. Executions, § 210, P. 449, which 
states: 
It has been held that it is the title of the debtor 
himself, as fixed by his deed, which determines 
whether the property shall be considered as one 
lot or several for the purpose of an execution 
sale, but it cannot be said that because a deed 
describes the property conveyed as certain numbered 
lots that such lots do or do not constitute 
separate parcels. An owner may convert two or more 
lots into one known parcel by his use of the land, 
and a parcel may be single although divided by a 
street. 
Where the property to be sold is subject to a mortgage, 
the proper course is to sell en masse, unless the mortgagor has 
conveyed his equity in the different parcels to different 
grantees. 33 C.J.S. Executions, § 210b. 
The Utah County property does not consist of several 
known lots or parcels, but consists of and has been treated by 
all of the parties as one unified piece of property. 
Therefore, the Utah County property was properly sold as one 
17 
parcel of land and the lower court properly found that the 
Sheriff's sale was lawfully and properly conducted. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellants have failed to meet their burden of proving 
that the evidence before the lower court clearly preponderates 
against the lower court's findings. Further, Appellants waived 
their right to have the property sold in separate lots and have 
failed to show that they have been prejudiced in any way by the 
sale of the property en masse. Finally, the property at issue 
has been consistently treated by the parties as a single 
unified parcel and was properly sold as such. 
Therefore, Respondents respectfully request that this 
Court affirm the ruling of the lower court and uphold the sale 
of the Utah County property and the entry of a Deficiency 
Judgment. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 4th day of August, 1989. 
S. Hart 
ieys for Respondents 
is 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that four (4) true and correct 
copies of the foregoing RESPONDENTS' BRIEF was mailed by United 
States mail, postage prepaid, on this 4th day of August, 1989, 
addressed as follows: 
Jackson Howard, Esq. 
Leslie W. Slaugh, Esq. 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
120 East 300 North 
Provo^ Utah 84606 
LSH\P\Plead 
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Rule 69. Execution and proceedings supplemental there-
to. 
(a) Issuance of writ of execution. Process to enforce a judgment shall be 
by a writ of execution unless the court otherwise directs, which may issue at 
any time within eight years after the entry of judgment, (except an execution 
may be stayed pursuant to Rule 62) either in the county in which such judg-
ment was rendered, or in any county in which a transcript thereof has been 
filed and docketed in the office of the clerk of the district court. Notwithstand-
ing the death of a party after judgment execution thereon may be issued, or 
such judgment may be enforced, as follows: 
(1) In case of the death of the judgment creditor, upon the application of 
his executor or administrator, or successor in interest. 
(2) In case of the death of the judgment debtor, if the judgment is for 
the recovery of real or personal property or the enforcement of a lien 
thereon. 
(b) Contents of writ and to whom it may be directed. The writ of execu-
tion must be issued in the name of the state of Utah, sealed with the seal of 
the court and subscribed by the clerk. It may be issued to the sheriff of any 
county in the state (and may be issued at the same time to different counties) 
but where it requires the delivery of possession or sale of real property, it 
must be issued to the sheriff of the county where the property or some part 
thereof is situated. If it requires delivery of possession or sale of personal 
property, it may be issued to a constable. It must intelligibly refer to the 
judgment, stating the court, the county where the same is entered or docketed, 
the names of the parties, the judgment, and, if it is for money, the amount 
thereof, and the amount actually due thereon. It shall be directed to the 
sheriff of the county in which it is to be executed in cases involving real 
property, and shall require the officer to proceed in accordance with the terms 
of the writ; provided that if such writ is against the property of the judgment 
debtor generally it may direct the constable to satisfy the judgment, with 
interest, out of the personal property of the debtor, and if sufficient personal 
property cannot be found, then the sheriff shall satisfy the judgment, with 
interest, out of his real property. 
If the judgment requires the sale of property, the writ of execution shall 
recite such judgment, or the material parts thereof, and direct the officer to 
execute the judgment by making the sale and applying the proceeds in confor-
mity therewith. The judgment creditor may require a certified copy of the 
judgment to be served with the execution upon the party against whom the 
judgment was rendered, or upon the person or officer required thereby or by 
law to obey the same, and obedience thereto may be enforced by the court. 
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(c) When writ to be returned. The writ of execution shall be made return-
able at any time within two months after its receipt by the officer. It shall be 
returned to the court from which it issued, and when it is returned the clerk 
must attach it to the record. 
(d) Service of the writ. Unless the execution otherwise directs, the officer 
must execute the writ against the property of the judgment debtor by levying 
on a sufficient amount of property, if there is sufficient [property]; collecting 
or selling the choses in action and selling the other property, and paying to 
the judgment creditor or his attorney so much of the proceeds as will satisfy 
the judgment. Any excess in the proceeds over the judgment and accruing 
costs must be returned to the judgment debtor, unless otherwise directed by 
the judgment or order of the court. When there is more property of the judg-
ment debtor than is sufficient to satisfy the judgment and accruing costs 
within view of the officer, he must levy only on such part of the property as 
the judgment debtor may indicate, if the property indicated is amply sufficient 
to satisfy the judgment and costs. 
When an officer has begun to serve an execution issued out of any court on 
or before the return day of such execution he may complete the service and 
return thereof after such return day. If he shall have begun to serve an execu-
tion, and shall die or be incapable of completing the service and return 
thereof, the same may be completed by any other officer who might by law 
execute the same if delivered to him; and if the first officer shall not have 
made a certificate of his doings, the second officer shall certify whatever he 
shall find to have been done by the first, and shall add thereto a certificate of 
his own doings in completing the service. 
(e) Proceedings on sale of property. 
(1) Notice. Before the sale of the property on execution notice thereof 
must be given as follows: (1) in case of perishable property, by posting 
written notice of the time and place of sale in three public places of the 
precinct or city where the sale is to take place, for such a time as may be 
reasonable, considering the character and condition of the property; (2) in 
case of other personal property, by posting a similar notice in at least 
three public places of the precinct or city where the sale is to take place, 
for not less than 7 nor more than 14 days; (3) in case of real property, by 
posting a similar notice, particularly describing the property, for 21 days, 
on the property to be sold, at the place of sale, and also in at least 3 public 
places of the precinct or city where the property to be sold is situated, and 
publishing a copy thereof at least 3 times, once a week for 3 successive 
weeks immediately preceding the sale, in some newspaper published in 
the county, if there is one. 
(2) Postponement . If at the time appointed for the sale of any real or 
personal property on execution the officer shall deem it expedient and for 
the interest of all persons concerned to postpone the sale for want of 
purchasers, or other sufficient cause, he may postpone the same from time 
to time, until the same shall be completed; and in every such case he shall 
make public declaration thereof at the time and place previously ap-
pointed for the sale, and if such postponement is for a longer time than 
one day, notice thereof shall be given in the same manner as the original 
notice of such sale is required to be given. 
(3) Conduct of sale. All sales of property under execution must be 
made at auction to the highest bidder, between the hours of 9 o'clock a.m. 
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and 5 o'clock p.m. After sufficient property has been sold to satisfy the 
execution no more shall be sold. Neither the officer holding the execution 
norhis deputy shall become a purchaser, or be interested in any purchase 
at such sale. When the sale is of personal property capable of manual 
delivery it must be within view of those who attend the sale, and it must 
be sold in such parcels as are likely to bring the highest price; and when 
the sale is of real property, consisting of several known lots or parcels, 
they must be sold separately; or when a portion of such real property is 
claimed by a third person, and he requires it to be sold separately, such 
portion must be thus sold. All sales of real property must be made at the 
courthouse of the county in which the property, or some part thereof, is 
situated. The judgment debtor, if present at the sale, may also direct the 
order in which the property, real or personal, shall be sold, when such 
property consists of several known lots or parcels, or of articles which can 
be sold to advantage separately, and the officer must follow such direc-
tions. 
(4) Purchaser refusing to pay. Every bid shall be deemed an irrevo-
cable offer; and if the purchaser refuses to pay the amount bid by him for 
the property struck off to him at a sale under execution, the officer may 
again sell the property at any time to the highest bidder, and if any loss is 
occasioned thereby, the party refusing to pay, in addition to being liable 
on such bid, is guilty of a contempt of court and may be punished accord-
ingly. When a purchaser refuses to pay, the officer may also, in his discre-
tion, thereafter reject any other bid of such person. 
(5) Personal property. When the purchaser of any personal property 
pays the purchase money, the officer making the sale shall deliver the 
property to the purchaser (if such property is capable of manual delivery) 
and shall execute and deliver to him a certificate of sale and payment. 
Such certificate shall state that all right, title and interest which the 
debtor had in and to such property on the day the execution or attach-
ment was levied, and any right, title and interest since acquired, is trans-
ferred to the purchaser. 
(6) Real property. Upon a sale of real property the officer shall give to 
the purchaser a certificate of sale, containing: (1) a particular description 
of the real property sold; (2) the price paid by him lor each lot or parcel if 
sold separately; (3) the whole price paid; (4) a statement to the effect that 
all right, title, interest and claim of the judgment debtor in and to the 
property is conveyed to the purchaser; provided that where such sale is 
subject to redemption that fact shall be stated also. A duplicate of such 
certificate shall be filed for record by the officer in the office of the re-
corder of the county. The real property sold shall be subject to redemption, 
except where the estate sold is less than a leasehold of a two-years' unex-
pired term, in which event said sale is absolute. 
(f) Redemption from sale. 
(1) Who may redeem. Property sold subject to redemption, or any part 
sold separately, may be redeemed by the following persons or their suc-
cessors in interest: (1) the judgment debtor; (2) a creditor having a lien by 
judgment or mortgage on the property sold, or on some share or part 
thereof, subsequent to that on which the property was sold. 
(2) Redemption; how made. At the time of redemption the person 
seeking the same may make payment of the amount required to the 
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person from whom the property is being redeemed, or for him to the 
officer who made the sale, or his successor in office. At the same time the 
redemptioner must produce to the officer or person from whom he seeks to 
redeem, and serve with his notice to the officer: (1) a certified copy of the 
docket of the judgment under which he claims the right to redeem, or, if 
he redeems upon a mortgage or other lien, a memorandum of the record 
thereof certified by the recorder; (2) an assignment, properly acknowl-
edged or proved where the same is necessary to establish his claim; (3) an 
affidavit by himself or his agent showing the amount then actually due on 
the lien. 
(3) Time for redemption; amount to be paid. The property may be 
redeemed from the purchaser within six months after the sale on paying 
the amount of his purchase with 6 percent thereon in addition, together 
with the amount of any assessment or taxes, and any reasonable sum for 
fire insurance and necessary maintenance, upkeep, or repair of any im-
provements upon the property which the purchaser may have paid 
thereon after the purchase, with interest on such amounts, and, if the 
purchaser is also a creditor having a lien prior to that of the person 
seeking redemption, other than the judgment under which said purchase 
was made, the amount of such lien, with interest. 
In the event there is a disagreement as to whether any sum demanded 
for redemption is reasonable or proper, the person seeking redemption 
may pay the amount necessary for redemption, less the amount in dis-
pute, to the court out of which execution or order authorizing the sale was 
issued, and at the same time file with the court a petition setting forth the 
item or items demanded to which he objects, together with his grounds of 
objection; and thereupon the court shall enter an order fixing a time for 
hearing of such objections. A copy of the petition and order fixing time for 
hearing shall be served on the purchaser not less than two days before the 
day of hearing. Upon the hearing of the objections the court shall enter an 
order determining the amount required for redemption. In the event an 
additional amount to that theretofore paid to the clerk is required, the 
person seeking redemption shall pay to the clerk such additional amount 
within 7 days. The purchaser shall forthwith execute and deliver a proper 
certificate of redemption upon being paid the amount required by the 
court for redemption. 
(4) Subsequent redemptions. If the property is redeemed by a credi-
tor, any other creditor having a right of redemption may, within 60 days 
after the last redemption and within six months after the sale, redeem the 
property from such last redemptioner in the same manner as provided in 
the preceding subdivision, upon paying the sum of such last redemption, 
with three percent thereon in addition and the amount of any assessment 
or tax, and any reasonable sum for fire insurance and necessary mainte-
nance, upkeep or repair of any improvements upon the property which 
the last redemptioner may have paid thereon, with interest on such 
amount, and, in addition, the amount of any lien held by such last re-
demptioner prior to his own, with interest. Written notice of any redemp-
tion shall be given to the officer and a duplicate filed with the recorder of 
the county. Similar notice shall be given of any taxes or assessments or 
any sums for fire insurance, and necessary maintenance, upkeep or repair 
of any improvements upon the property, paid by the person redeeming, or 
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the amount of any lien acquired, other than upon which the redemption 
was made. Failure to file such notice shall relieve any subsequent re-
demptioner of the obligation to pay such taxes, assessments, or other 
liens. 
(5) Where no redemption is made. If no redemption is made within 
six months after the sale, the purchaser or his assignee is entitled to a 
conveyance; or if so redeemed, whenever sixty days have elapsed and no 
other redemption by a creditor has been made and notice thereof has been 
given, the last redemptioner, or his assignee, is entitled to a sheriff's deed 
at the expiration of six months after the sale. If the judgment debtor 
redeems, he must make the same payments as are required to effect a 
redemption by a creditor. If the debtor redeems, the effect of the sale is 
, terminated and he is restored to his estate. Upon a redemption by the 
debtor, the person to whom the payment is made must execute and de-
liver to him a certificate of redemption, duly acknowledged. Such certifi-
cate must be filed and recorded in the office of the county recorder where 
the property is situated. 
(6) Rents during period of redemption. The purchaser from the 
time of sale until a redemption, and a redemptioner from the time of his 
redemption until another redemption, is entitled to receive from the ten-
ant in possession the rents of the property sold or the value of the use and 
occupation thereof. But when any rents or profits have been received by 
the judgment creditor or purchaser, or his or their assigns, from the prop-
erty thus sold preceding such redemption, the amounts of such rents and 
profits shall be a credit upon the redemption money to be paid; and if the 
redemptioner or judgment debtor, before the expiration of the time al-
lowed for such redemption, demands in writing of such purchaser or credi-
tor, or his assigns, a written and verified statement of the amounts of 
such rents and profits thus received, the period for redemption is ex-
tended five days after such sworn statement is given by such purchaser or 
his assigns to such redemptioner or debtor. If such purchaser or his as-
signs shall for a period of one month from and after such demand, fail or 
refuse to give such statement, such redemptioner or debtor may, within 
sixty days after such demand, bring an action to compel an accounting 
and disclosure of such rents and profits, and until fifteen days from and 
after the final determination of such action the right of redemption is 
extended to such redemptioner or debtor. 
(g) Remedies of purchaser . 
(1) For waste. Until the expiration of the time allowed for redemption, 
the court may restrain the commission of waste on the property, upon 
motion, with or without notice, of the purchaser, or his successor in inter-
est. But it is not waste for the person in possession of the property at the 
time of sale, or entitled to possession afterwards, during the period al-
lowed for redemption, to continue to use it in the same manner in which it 
was previously used, or to use it in the ordinary course of husbandry, or to 
make the necessary repairs or buildings thereon or to use wood or timber 
on the property therefor, or for the repair of fences, or for fuel for his 
family while he occupies the property. After his estate has become abso-
lute, the purchaser or his successor in interest may maintain an action to 
recover damages for injury to the property by the tenant in possession 
after sale and before possession is delivered under the conveyance. 
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(2) Where purchaser fails to obtain possession of property or is 
dispossessed thereof or evicted therefrom. Where, because of irregu-
larities in the proceedings concerning the sale, or because the property 
sold was not subject to execution and sale, or because of the reversal or 
discharge of the judgment, a purchaser of property sold on execution, or 
his successor in interest, fails to obtain the property or is dispossessed 
thereof or evicted therefrom, the court having jurisdiction thereof shall, 
on motion of such party and after such notice to the judgment creditor as 
the court may prescribe, enter judgment against such judgment creditor 
for the price paid by the purchaser, together with interest. In the alterna-
tive, if such purchaser or his successor in interest, fails to recover posses-
sion of any property or is dispossessed thereof or evicted therefrom in 
consequence of irregularity in the proceedings concerning the sale, or 
because the property sold was not subject to execution and sale, the court 
having jurisdiction thereof shall, on motion of such party and after such 
notice to the judgment debtor as the court may prescribe, revive the 
original judgment in the name of the petitioner for the amount paid by 
such purchaser at the sale, with interest thereon from the time of pay-
ment at the same rate that the original judgment bore; and the judgment 
so revived shall have the same force and effect as would an original 
judgment of the date of the revival. 
(h) Contribution and reimbursement; how enforced. When upon an 
execution against several persons more than a pro rata part of the judgment is 
satisfied out of the proceeds of the sale of the property of one, or one of them 
pays, without a sale, more than his proportion, and the right of contribution 
exists, he may compel such contribution from the others; and where a judg-
ment against several is upon an obligation of one or more as security for the 
others, and the surety has paid the amount or any part thereof, by sale of 
property or otherwise, he may require reimbursement from the principal. The 
person entitled to contribution or reimbursement shall, within one month 
after payment, or sale of his property in the event there is a sale, file in the 
court where the judgment was rendered a notice of such payment and his 
claim for contribution or reimbursement. Upon the filing of such notice the 
clerk must make an entry thereof in the margin of the docket which shall 
have the effect of a judgment against the other judgment debtors to the extent 
of their liability for contribution or reimbursement. 
(i) Payment of judgment by person indebted to j udgmen t debtor . Af-
ter the issuance of an execution and before its return, any person indebted to 
the judgment debtor may pay to the officer the amount of his debt, or so much 
thereof as may be necessary to satisfy the execution, and the officer's receipt is 
a sufficient discharge for the amount paid. 
(j) Where property is claimed by third person. If an officer shall proceed 
to levy any execution on any goods or chattels claimed by any person other 
than the defendant, or should he be requested by the judgment creditor so to 
do, such officer may require the judgment creditor to give an undertaking, 
with good and sufficient sureties, to pay all costs and damages that he may 
sustain by reason of the detention or sale of such property; and until such 
undertaking is given, the officer may refuse to proceed against such property. 
(k) Order for appea rance of judgment debtor; a r res t . At any time 
when execution may issue on a judgment, the court from which an execution 
might issue shall, upon written motion of the judgment creditor, with or 
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without notice as the court may determine, issue an order requiring the judg-
ment debtor, or if a corporation, any officer thereof, to appear before the court 
or a master at a specified time and place to answer concerning his or its 
property. A judgment debtor, or if a corporation, any officer thereof, may be 
required to attend outside the county in which he resides, but the court may 
make such order as to mileage and expenses as is just. The order may also 
restrain the judgment debtor from disposing of any nonexempt property pend-
ing the hearing. Upon the hearing such proceedings may be had for the appli-
cation of the property of the judgment debtor toward the satisfaction of the 
judgment as on execution against such property. 
In aid of an order requiring the attendance of the judgment debtor, the court 
may, upon satisfactory proof by affidavit or otherwise, that there is danger of 
the debtor's absconding, order the sheriff to arrest the debtor and bring him 
before the court, and may order such judgment debtor to enter into an under-
taking with sufficient sureties, that he will attend from time to time before 
the court or master, as may be directed during the pendency of the proceed-
ings and until the final determination thereof, and will not in the meantime 
dispose of any portion of his property not exempt from executic-n. In default of 
entering into such undertaking, he may be committed to jail. 
(1) Examination of debtor of judgment debtor. At any time when execu-
tion may issue on a judgment, upon proof by affidavit or otherwise to the 
satisfaction of the court that any person or corporation has property of such 
judgment debtor or is indebted to him in an amount exceeding fifty dollars, 
not exempt from execution, the court may order such person or corporation or 
any officer or agent thereof, to appear before the court or a master at a speci-
fied time and place to answer concerning the same. Witness fees and mileage, 
if any, may be awarded by the court. 
Cm) Order prohibit ing transfer of property. If it appears that a person 
or corporation, alleged to have property of the judgment debtor or to be in-
debted to him in an amount exceeding fifty dollars, not exempt from execu-
tion, claims an interest in the property adverse to such judgment debtor or 
denies such indebtedness, the court may order such person or corporation to 
refrain from transferring or otherwise disposing of such interest or debt until 
such time as may reasonably be necessary for the judgment creditor to bring 
an action to determine such interest or claim and prosecute the same to judg-
ment. Such order may be modified or vacated by the court at any time upon 
such terms as may be just. 
(n) Witnesses. Witnesses may be required to appear and testify in any 
proceedings brought under Subdivisions (k) and (1) of this rule in the same 
manner as upon the trial of an issue. 
(o) Order for proper ty to be applied on judgment . The court or master 
may order any property of the judgment debtor, not exempt from execution, in 
the hands of such debtor, or any other person, or due to the judgment debtor, 
to be applied towards the satisfaction of the judgment. 
(p) Appointment of receiver. The court may appoint a receiver of the 
property of the judgment debtor, not exempt from execution, and may forbid 
any transfer or other disposition thereof or interference therewith until its 
further order therein; provided that before any receiver shall be vested with 
the real property of the judgment debtor a certified copy of his appointment 
shall be recorded in the office of the recorder of the county in which any real 
estate sought to be affected thereby is situated. 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DON W. INGRAM and DICK L. 
INGRAM, et al., 
Plaintiff. 
vs. 
O.B. SHEEP COMPANY, a 
partnersheep, SNELL OLSEN, 
SCOTT H. OLSEN, et al., 
******* 
Case Number CV 86 1100 
RULING 
GEORGE E. BALLIF, JUDGE 
Defendant, 
******** 
Pursuant to a hearing held the 28th day of October, 
1988 and oral argument there presented together with affidavits 
and memorandum of law, the Court makes the following findings: 
1. That the sale of the subject property was called by 
Deputy Sherrif, Arthur L. Adcock, on the 3rd day of August, 1988, 
and that he then conducted the sale of the real estate described 
in the order of sale. 
2. That Snell Olsen was personally known to said 
deputy sheriff and was present at the sheriff's sale held on the 
aforesaid date. 
3. That the sale was conducted in the standard 
procedure for the Utah County Sheriff's Office with regard to 
sales involving mutiple parcels of real property and that the 
B-l 
parties in attendance were asked at the sale if any of the 
parties desired to have multiple parcels sold separately. That no 
request was made by anyone including Snell Olsen, and that the 
property was sold as one unit. 
Pursuant to the aforesaid finding the Court concludes 
that at the Sherrif's Sale on August 3, 1988 defendant, O.B. 
Sheep Company and/or any of its partners including Snell Olsen 
failed to make a request that the property be sold as separate 
parcels and they therefore waived any such right O.B. Sheep 
Company and its partners would have had at that time to have the 
property sold as separate parcels, and the sale as conducted by 
Deputy Sheriff Adcock was done in a lawful and proper manner. 
Therefore the plaintiff's motion to enter the 
deficiency judgment resulting from the aforesaid sale is granted 
and the defendant's objection thereto is disallowed. 
ft7 
Dated at Provo, Utah this /<ff day of January, 1989. 
BY THE COURT 
cc: Michael N. Zundel 
Leslie W. Slaugh 
GEORGE <E 
B-2 
Tab 3 
* 11 V 
I9S3 DEC - 2 AH fr 4 2 
J a m e s M. Dunn (#934) 
Michael N. Zundel (#^755) 
Laurie S. Hart (#4844) 
JARDINE, LINEBAUGH, BROWN & DUNN 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
370 East South Temple, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-7700 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DON W. INGRAM and DICK L. 
INGRAM, et al. , 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
O.B. SHEEP COMPANY, a 
partnership, SNELL OLSEN, 
SCOTT H. OLSEN, et al., 
Defendants, 
AFFIDAVIT OF UTAH 
COUNTY DEPUTY SHERIFF 
ARTHUR L. ADCOCK 
Civi J No. CV 86-1100 
(Judge BalJ if) 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF UTAH 
) ss. 
Arthur L. Adcock, after being first duly sworn by mo, 
declares that: 
1. I am currently employed as a Deputy Sher iff for 
Utah County, State of Utah, and have pergonal knowledge of Uv* 
facts set forth hereafter . 
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2. In my capacity as a Deputy Sheriff for Utah 
County, I have responsibility for conducting Sheriff's sales 
for real property located in Utah County. 
3. On August 3, 1988, pursuant to Court Ordor in the 
case of Don W. Ingram and Dick L. Ingramz_et _aj L v. O.B._^hcep 
Company, a partnership, Snell Olsen, Sc_otJt H. 01 sen, et al . , 
Civil No. CV86-1100, I conducted a Sheriff's sale with regard 
to the real estate described in said Order of Sale, and more 
particularly described on attached Exhibit A» 
4. Snell Olsen, who is personally known to me, was 
present at said Sheriff's sale held on August 3, 1988. 
5. The standard operating procedure Cor the Utah 
County Sheriff's Office with regard to Sheriff's sales 
involving multiple parcels of real property is to ask the 
parties in attendance at the sale if any of the parties desire 
to have the multiple parcels sold separately. Unless a party 
in attendance at the sale specifically requests that the 
multiple parcels be sold separately, the standard procedure is 
to sell the real property involved as a single parcel. 
6. In conducting the Sheriff's sale on August 3, 
1988, I followed the standard operating procedure set forth in 
paragraph 5 above. 
7. None of the parties in attendance at the 
Sheriff's sale held on August 3, 1988, including Snell Olsen, 
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requested that the parcels involved be sold separately, nor did 
any party present at the sale object to the fact that the real 
property involved was sold as a single unit. 
DATED this %6 day of October, J 988. 
x 
ARTHUR f,. ADCOCK 
Utah County Deputy Sheriff 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this 28 th ctoy of 
October, 1988, by ARTHUR T.. ADCOCK. 
&x&te&p-a^--
LSH-p335 
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EXHIBIT "A" 
UTAH COUNTY 
Parcel No. 7; All of Section lr Township 11 
Southf Range 8 East, Salt Lake Base and 
Meridian. 
Parcel No. 8: Lots lr 2, 3 and 4r the South 
half of the North half, and the South half 
of Section 3, Township 11 South, Range 8 
East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian. 
Parcel No. 9: All of Section 4, Township 11 
South, Range 8 East, Salt Lake Base and 
Meridian. Excepting therefrom the Southeast 
quarter of the Southeast quarter of said 
section. 
Parcel No. 10: Lots 1 and 2, the South half 
oT the Northeast quarter lying East of 
Highway, and the Southeast quarter lying 
East of Highway of Section 5, Township 11 
South, Range 8 East, Salt Lake Base and 
Meridian. 
Parcel No. 11; The West half and the 
Southeast quarter, the Southwest quarter of 
the Northeast quarter, and that portion of 
the Northeast quarter of the Northeast 
quarter lying East of Highway of Section 5, 
Township 11 South, Range 8 East, Salt Lake 
Base and Meridian. 
Parcel No. 12: The* North half of the 
Southeast quarter of the Southeast quarter 
of Section 9, Township 11 South, Range 8 
East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian. Excepting 
therefrom that portion of the Southwest 
quarter of the Northwest quarter lying West 
of the Highway. 
Parcel No. 13: The West half, the Northeast 
quarter, and the South half of the Southeast 
quarter of Section 10, Township 11 South, 
Range 8 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian. 
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